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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
§ 78A-4-103(2)O). This case was properly transferred under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-
102( 4) from the Utah Supreme Court, which had jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-
3-102(3)O). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES & RULES OF PROCEDURE 
Not applicable. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case, Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
This is a personal injury case arising from a pedestrian/automobile accident that 
took place on the evening of October 23, 2012 when Shannon, driving a tow truck owned 
by his employer, Ogden Auto Body ("Ogden"), was involved in an automobile/pedestrian 
accident with the Plaintiff-Appellant. Ogden took the position that Shannon was 
commuting home at the time of the Accident and therefore was not vicariously liable for 
the Accident. 
Like other tow truck drivers, Ogden assigned Shannon to respond to calls within a 
specific geographic territory. Because his territory was close to his home, Shannon kept 
his tow truck at his home. His days typically started at 7:00 am when he would leave his 
home in the company tow truck and go to various locations around the Layton area to wait 
for calls from the Ogden dispatcher. He would then drive the tow truck to service calls in 
his area until the evening when he would generally drive his tow truck home. Though 
Shannon would report when his last service call of the day was completed, he always 
understood that he was "on-call" if needed by Ogden to respond to calls in his area if 
needed during overnight hours. 
As Ogden personnel stated in deposition, taking the company tow truck home was 
"just part of the job" for Ogden drivers so that they could quickly respond to service calls 
in their respective territory. Ogden's customers expected Ogden to respond to a call within 
20-30 minutes. In order to meet this demand, Ogden communicated with Shannon via his 
cell phone and he was almost always on-call unless he got permission from Ogden to take 
time-off. 
October 23, 2012 was no different. Shannon testified at deposition that he got up 
and left his home in the morning to begin his work day by waiting at a local parking lot. 
He responded to what would be his last call of the day, a tow from Layton to Brigham City 
during the late afternoon hours. At around 6:36pm, Shannon called into Ogden and 
"cleared out" of the call intent on returning to South Ogden. After stopping to pick up 
dinner at a local Kneaders, Shannon began driving back to his home. At approximately 
7:15pm, he turned left onto 2000 South from Washington Boulevard and collided with the 
Plaintiff-Appellant as he crossed the street (the "Accident"). 
On November 17, 2014, Ogden moved for summary judgment for all of the 
Plaintiffs-Appellants' claims. In sum, Ogden maintained that the so-called "corning and 
going rule" applied to this case and that it is not vicariously liable for the Accident. (R. 
604.) It argued that the undisputed facts demonstrated that Shannon was driving home 
from work intent on not doing any further work to benefit Ogden that night and that it 
exercised no control over him at the time of the Accident. (R.604.) 
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The District Court granted Ogden's motion for summary judgment largely because 
it summarily determined that Shannon was not within the course and scope of his 
employment at the time of the Accident. The Court also granted Ogden's motion for 
summary judgment finding that it was not negligent in the hiring, training, and entrustment 
of company vehicles to Shannon. (R. 1414, R. 1461.) 
Following the hearing, Ogden drafted a proposed order of judgment and sought to 
have the judgment certified as final under Utah R. Civ. P. 54 (b) to allow for this 
interlocutory appeal. Plaintiff-Appellant objected to the Utah R. Civ. P. 54 (b) motion. 
Ultimately, after a hearing on the Utah R. Civ. P. 54 (b) motion, the Court certified 
judgment for Ogden as final, allowing for this appeal. Though Plaintiff-Appellant initially 
asked this Court to review the District Court's decision to certify judgment for Ogden 
pursuant Utah R. Civ. P. 54 (b), in his brief to this Court he did not address this issue. (R. 
1743.) Accordingly, Plaintiff-Appellant has waived this issue. 
Shannon filed a notice of additional appeal to allow him to address the District 
Court's determination that he was not within the course and scope of his employment at 
the time of the Accident. Shannon only agrees with the Plaintiff-Appellant as to this point. 
Facts Regarding the Accident and Michael Shannon's Activities and Employment 
Police records indicate that the Accident was called into the E911 center at or 
about 7:19:48 pm (19:19) on October 23, 2012. (R. 652-654, R. 656, R. 658, R. 665.) 
As part of his job with Ogden, Shannon drives a 5500 GMC 2009 Truck that is 
owned and maintained by Ogden (the "Truck"). (R. 890-891, R.904, R.919, lines 20-
21.) In order to cover its entire territory, Ogden assigns tow truck drivers to a respective 
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territory. In this case, Ogden assigned Shannon to handle service calls in the Layton 
area. During the day he would drive his truck from his home to various parking lots in 
that area and wait for calls. (R. 886-888.) 
Ogden communicates with its drivers using a remote "Ranger" system. Part of 
that system uses a global positioning system (GPS) to identify the location of their trucks 
during the day and night. Generally, Ogden would dispatch service calls to the driver 
that was closest geographically to any service call. Ogden drivers use a tablet computer 
to accept calls that they take out of their truck and into their home when they are at home 
in case of a call. (R. 911, lines 1-21, R. 912, lines 6-25, R. 913, lines 1-24, R. 914, lines 
4-25, R. 923, lines 3-25, R. 924, R. 925, lines 1-9.) In this case, Shannon was not 
comfortable using the "Ranger" system and the tablet and instead Ogden communicated 
with Shannon using his personal cell phone. (R.885, lines 1-8.) While Shannon could 
take time-off and not accept calls, he had to ask Ogden to do so in advance and notify 
Ogden that he was not on call so that they could dispatch another driver to handle calls 
in his region. (R.913, lines 10-20, R. 916, lines 14-21.) 
In deposition, both Ogden and Shannon readily admitted that taking the Truck home 
is "just part of the job" because employees can be called to a tow at any time even on their 
off-days if needed. As Ogden's Controller, Glenn Logan testified, "[y]ou're always on 
call." (R.880, lines 22-25, R. 881, lines 1-3, R. 913, lines 21-25, R. 914, lines 1-12, R. 925, 
lines 14-20.) As a result, Ogden drivers do not have a strict daily schedule or routine. (R. 
916, lines 14-21.) 
When Ogden hires a new driver, they start them at an hourly wage. However, once 
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this trial period is completed, a "good" driver, like Shannon, is put on a salary basis and 
given a territory. They do not have a set number of work hours. (R. 883, lines 6-15, R. 
908, lines 3-25, R. 909, lines 1-16.) 
In deposition, Shannon admitted that his Truck was essentially his "office". He 
testified that he took the truck home with him every night so that he could be able to 
respond to a call as soon as possible and that this was a benefit to Ogden. He also responds 
to calls from his home and after dinner for the benefit of Ogden. (R.880, lines 22-25, R. 
881, lines 1-3, 893, lines 17-25, R. 896, lines 20-25, R. 897, lines 1-2.) 
Shannon admits that he is not normally called by Ogden at night except when they 
are "swamped". This is because he is an older gentleman. That said, he understood that 
the nature of his work is very unpredictable and he never knew when he would get a call. 
(R. 893, R. 895, 1-16, R. 899, lines 9-17, R. 900, lines 1-21.) 
Ogden handles calls for local police departments and AAA. These, and other Ogden 
clients, require that its drivers respond to calls within 20-30 minutes that are in Ogden's 
assigned territory. (R. 893, lines 17-25, R. 926, lines 6-25.) 
In discovery, Ogden produced call records for Michael Shannon for the time period 
between July 1, 2012 and December 1, 2012. These records show that Shannon regularly 
worked after 7 :00pm for Ogden handling calls. For the period of time between July 1, 
2012 and December 1, 2012, Shannon completed 44 calls after 7:00pm (19:00). He 
handled 38 calls after 7:00pm (19:00) in the weeks prior to the Accident. Below is a chart 
summarizing these 44 calls that involved Shannon working after 7:00pm on a respective 
day: 
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Date: Time Call Received: 
July 3, 2012 19:41 
July 6, 2012 18:01 
July 10, 2012 18:19 
July 11, 2012 19:02 
Julyll,2012 20:19 
July 12, 2012 18:39 
July 13, 2012 18:21 
July 17, 2012 18:15 
July 18, 2012 18:33 
July 18, 2012 18:42 
July 19, 2012 19:03 
July 20, 2012 17:35 
July 25, 2012 18:58 
July 25, 2012 19:07 
July 26, 2012 19:42 
August 7, 2012 18:27 
August 8, 2012 18:24 
August 9, 2012 17:55 
August 13, 2012 18:11 
August 20, 2012 18:46 
August 21, 2012 18:28 
August 22, 2012 19:20 
August24,2012 18:15 
August 26, 2012 18:06 
August 27, 2012 17:55 
August 29, 2012 17:39 
August 30, 2012 19:14 
Sept. 12, 2012 19:20 
Sept. 17, 2012 18:18 
Sept. 19, 2012 18:15 
Sept. 20, 2012 18:55 
Sept. 25, 2012 18:38 
October 1, 2012 18:13 
October 1, 2012 18:13 
October 5, 2012 18:42 
October 8, 2012 17:43 
October 11, 2012 18:20 
October 17, 2012 18:26 
October 29, 2012 19:37 
November 5, 2012 18:41 
November 12, 2012 18:34 
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Time Call Completed: 
20:51 
19:28 
19:38 
20:30 
21:08 
19:40 
19:32 
19:27 
19:15 
19:46 
20:16 
19:31 
19:49 
20:42 
20:46 
19:23 
22:29 
19:45 
19:55 
19:50 
19:20 
19:59 
19:13 
20:01 
20:23 
19:22 
20:20 
20:28 
19:29 
19:19 
20:21 
19:34 
19: 15 
19:15 
19:30 
19:46 
19:17 
20:27 
21:06 
20:15 
19:28 
November 20, 2012 18:10 
November 21, 2012 18:34 
November 27, 2012 18:34 
(R. 928-949) 
19:35 
19:43 
22:00 
On the night of the Accident in this case, Shannon returned home after police told 
him he could do so. Shannon testified that had he been asked by Ogden to respond to a 
call in the hours after the Accident he would have responded. (R. 897, lines 3-11, R. 899-
900.) 
Ogden allows drivers to run personal errands with their trucks and to eat meals in 
their trucks. That said, Shannon testified that he generally did not run personal errands 
with his company truck without permission and preferred to use his wife's Lexus SUV for 
personal errands. (R. 881-882, R. 889, lines 2-14, R. 898, lines 1-13, R. 915, lines 6-25.) 
After the Accident, Shannon's supervisor spoke with him regarding the Accident. 
Ogden paid Shannon's citation and hired a lawyer named Randy Richards to defend 
Shannon for the traffic citation. (R. 892, lines 12-21, R. 917, lines 7-18.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District Court committed numerous legal errors. In sum, scope of employment 
issues are inherently fact-bound and, unless clear-cut, such determinations are made by the 
fact-finder. Here, the District Court erred by taking this question from the jury because 
reasonable minds could differ as to if Shannon was within the course and scope of his 
employment at the time of the Accident. This determination was not clear-cut by any 
means. 
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Ogden argued, almost exclusively, that the "coming and going" exception to 
respondeat superior liability applied because Shannon was merely commuting home at the 
time of the Accident. However, the District Court did not consider the undisputed facts 
that demonstrated how Shannon's operation of his employer-provided Truck conferred a 
benefit to Ogden or how Ogden maintained sufficient control over Shannon and the Truck 
at the time of the Accident to bring him within the course and scope of his employment by 
utilizing a GPS tracking system that allowed Ogden to know the location of the Truck and 
to assign calls to Shannon based on his location. 
In addition, Shannon agrees with the Plaintiff-Appellant regarding that the Court 
should adopt the "instrumentality" exception applied in workers compensation cases in 
Utah to negligence cases based upon respondeat superior but only to the extent that it 
would apply to employees operating employer-provided vehicles that are necessary for the 
employee's work. 
Finally, Shannon agrees with the Plaintiff-Appellant that Ogden's ratification of 
Shannon's actions placed him in the course and scope of his employment for purposes of 
respondeat superior. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT 
SHANNON WAS NOT WITHIN THE COURSE AND SCOPE OF HIS 
EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT. 
A. The Standard for Vicarious Liability is Fact-Bound and, as in this Case, is 
More Appropriate for a Jury Determination. 
Absent absolutely clear-cut cases, a determination as to if an employer is vicariously 
liable for the acts of its employee is best reserved for a jury determination. 
"An employer may held vicariously liable for the acts of its employee if the 
employee is in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the act giving rise to 
the injury." Castellanos v. Tommy John, LLC, 2014 UT App. 48, ,r 39,321 P.3d 218 (citing 
Newman v. White Water Whirlpool, 2008 UT 79, ,rs, 197 P.3d 654). The test for course 
and scope of employment involves the three-part Birkner test: ( 1) the employee's conduct 
must be of the general kind that the employee was employed to perform; (2) the employee's 
conduct must occur within the hours of the employee's work and the ordinary spatial 
boundaries of the employment; (3) the employee's conduct must be motivated, at least in 
part, by the purpose of serving the employer's interest. Newman, 2008 UT 79 at if9 (citing 
Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P .2d 1053, 1056-1057 (Utah 1989). 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized that "[ s ]cope of employment questions are 
inherently fact bound." Newman, 2008 UT 79 at ,rs. These questions are reserved for the 
fact-finder and "must submitted to a jury 'whenever reasonable minds may differ as to 
whether the [employee] was at a certain time within the scope of employment."' Newman, 
2008 UT 79 at ,r 10 (emph. in original). 
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As elaborated, in this case the record before the District Court contained a number 
of facts to demonstrate that Shannon was within the course and scope of his employment, 
or at least in a position where reasonable minds could differ, requiring the issue to go to 
trial. As detailed, Shannon's operation of the Truck at the time of the Accident had a dual 
purpose because it conferred a benefit to Ogden, at the time of the Accident Ogden had 
sufficient control over Shannon to bring him within the course and scope of his 
employment, and his Truck was an instrumentality of his employment suggesting that he 
was within the course and scope of his employment. 
B. Reasonable Minds Could Differ as to if Shannon was in the Course and Scope 
of Employment at the Time of the Accident. 
The District Court's decision would only be appropriate if reasonable minds could 
not differ as to if Shannon was in the course and scope of his employment at the time of 
the Accident. The record before the District Court shows that reasonable minds could 
clearly differ as to if Shannon was in the course and scope of his employment and summary 
judgment was not appropriate. 
i. Shannon's operation of the Truck at the time of the Accident had a "dual 
purpose" that provided a substantial benefit to Ogden. 
Despite the fact that Shannon was driving his Ogden Truck at a time when he was 
normally working and within his assigned tow territory, Ogden maintains that he was 
driving home from work and was subject to the so-called "coming and going" rule that 
exempts Ogden from vicarious liability. 
"[ A]n employee is not acting within the course and scope of his employment when 
he is traveling in his own automobile to and from work"'. Newman, 2008 UT 79 ,r 8 
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( quoting Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 801 P .2d 934, 935 (Utah 1989)). The 
intent of the rule is to avoid the imposition of "unlimited liability ... for [the] conduct of [ an 
employer's] employees over which it has no control and from which it derives no benefit. 
Id. 
The employer bears the burden of proving the exception to the general rule, or that 
the "coming and going rule" applies. State v. 633 E. 640, 942 P.2d 925, 933 (Utah, 1997) 
(Payne, J., concurring) (stating that one who claims an exception to the general rule bears 
the burden of proving that the exception applies); Jones & Trevor Mktg. v. Lowry, 2012 
UT 39, ,r 31,284 P.3d 630,639 (Utah 2012) ("the burden of proof [is] on the party seeking 
to have the court apply the exception to the general rule"). 
There are times when employees have a dual purpose while commuting possibly 
subjecting the employer to liability. "Where an employee engages in conduct benefitting 
the employer or which is controlled by the employer" the court weighs the benefit to an 
employer and employer's control against the personal nature of the trip to determine where 
it is appropriate to place liability. Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2003 UT 4, ,r 9, 73 
P .3d 315 ( emph. added). In Whitehead, the court implicitly adopted the "dual purpose 
exception" for negligence cases. 801 P.2d at 937. However, the Utah Supreme Court has 
not stated whether the "special errand" exception or the "employer-provided transportation 
exception" applies in negligence cases. See Ahlstrom, 2003 UT 4, ,r,r 16-17, 18. 
As the Plaintiff-Appellant points out, the Utah Supreme Court has adopted slightly 
different scopes of analysis in determining whether an employee is within the course and 
scope of employment. Appellant's Br. at 16. In negligence cases, there must be a 
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preponderance of evidence that the employee was acting within the course and scope of 
employment for there to be liability on the employer. Tax Comm 'n v. Industrial Comm 'n, 
685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984); Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor Comm 'n, 2007 UT 4, ,r 
22, 153 P .3d 179 (rejecting using the same standard in both workers compensation and 
negligence cases). 
In Newman, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that reasonable minds could differ 
as to if the employee was only commuting at the time of the accident when he collided with 
the plaintiff because employee's regular job responsibilities included hauling materials to 
job sites for his employer, installing materials, and "returning" the materials to his 
employer. Newman, 2008 UT 79 at ,r12 (emph. in original). At the time of the collision, 
5 :00 am, the employee of the tile and countertop manufacturer was driving his own 
personal vehicle and trailer carrying tile and countertop materials provided by his 
employer. The employer maintained that he was driving south on 1-15 to commute to work, 
but the Court started that the fact that the employee was carrying these materials suggested 
that it was possible that he was "acting in the course and scope of his employment at the 
time of the accident." 1 Newman, 2008 UT 79 at 2, 7. 
Ahlstrom discussed a number of cases involving off-duty but "on-call" police 
officers that were involved accidents and concluded from surveying the cases that there 
1 
"We agree with the court of appeals. Sundquist's regular job responsibilities included hauling materials to various 
job sites, installing the materials, and then returning the remainder of the materials to White Water's warehouse. 
Reasonable minds, therefore, could differ as to whether Sundquist was actually returning materials to White Water--
an act that would bring him within the course of his employment--or whether he was simply commuting to work, or 
perhaps both. Accordingly, an issue of material fact remained, and it should have been submitted to a jury for 
determination of whether Sundquist was "involved wholly or partly in the performance of his master's business or 
within the scope of his employment." Newman, 2008 UT 79 at ~12. 
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may be vicarious liability where the officer was on-call and had special skills. Ahlstrom, 
2003 UT 4 at ,r,r 8, 10-12. "The lesson of these cases is that cities are not held liable for 
commuting accidents of officers in city cars unless there are unique circumstances that tip 
the balance from a personal trip to one that primarily benefits the department." Id. at if 13. 
An employer may be held liable in third-party negligence claims where the 
predominant purpose of the conduct was not personal. Whitehead, 801 P .2d at 93 7. The 
Utah Supreme Court has stated that one "useful test" is to determine if the employee's 
commute has a dual purpose is to consider whether the employer would have sent another 
employee over the same route or to perform the same function if the trip had not been 
made. Id. Applying this test in Ahlstrom, the court determined that "it did not appear 
vitally necessary to the City that she be accessible while on personal errands," and thus the 
City only received a mere benefit that was "tangential" to the officer's purpose of driving 
back home. Ahlstrom, 2003 UT 4 at ,r,r 14-15. 
The benefit to the employer does not have to be significant. In a recent Florida case, 
the Appeals Court stated that there was a question of fact as to if an employee driver who 
was in between jobs with a company truck was acting for the benefit of his employer when 
he threw a padlock at the plaintiff believing that the plaintiff was going to rob him of the 
company's money after a collision. Valeo v. E. Coast Furniture Co., 95 So. 3d 921, 925 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
In this case, there are undisputed facts that demonstrate that it was "vitally 
necessary" that Shannon, and his truck, "be accessible" to Ogden at the time of the 
Accident and thus he conferred a substantial benefit to Ogden. In deposition, Shannon 
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acknowledged that his Truck was his "office" and that he took it home every night so that 
he was prepared to go to a call-the fact that he was equipped and ready to respond to any 
call was for the benefit of Ogden. (R.880, lines 22-25, R. 881, lines 1-3, 893, lines 17-25, 
R. 896, lines 20-25, R. 897, lines 1-2.) Ogden admitted that taking the Truck home was 
"just part of the job" because employees can be called out at any time. As Glenn Logan 
testified, "[y]ou're always on call". (R. 913, lines 21-25, 914, lines 1-12, R. 925, lines 14-
20.) Having the Truck at home and the driver at the ready was for the benefit of Ogden, 
who had to ensure that calls were handled within 20-30 minutes for their customer. (R.893, 
lines 17-25, 926, lines 6-25.) While Shannon testified that Ogden did not ask him to tow 
any more vehicles for the rest of the night after the Accident ( which would be expected 
after he was involved in the Accident), he testified that his work is very unpredictable and 
that had he been asked to respond to a call that night he would have. (R. 897, lines 3-11, 
R. 899-900.) 
Accordingly, the record before the District Court contained several undisputed 
material facts demonstrating that there was a dual purpose for Shannon's drive on that night 
with a substantial benefit to Ogden in driving the Truck home and its decision should be 
reversed. 
ii. Ogden exercised sufficient control over Shannon at the time of the 
Accident in order to bring his actions within the course and scope of his 
employment. 
In the alternative, Shannon agrees with the Plaintiff-Appellant that Shannon was 
within the course and scope of his employment because Ogden exercised sufficient control 
over him at the time of the Accident. 
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An employee is within the course and scope of his employment when he is under 
the employer's control. Whitehead, 801 P .2d at 93 7. In cases that consider the issue in the 
context of an employee who is driving at the time of the subject incident, the court weighs 
the employer's control against the personal nature of the trip. Ahlstrom, 2003 UT 4,, 9. 
Ogden exercised significant control over Shannon at the time of the Accident. 
Ogden admitted that taking the Truck home was "just part of the job" because employees 
can be called out at any time. As Glenn Logan testified, "[y]ou're always on call". (R. 
913, lines 21-25, 914, lines 1-12, R. 925, lines 14-20.) 
The best demonstration of how Ogden maintained control over its drivers was the 
use of the "Ranger" GPS system that allowed Ogden to identify the exact location of their 
trucks, at any time of day, and to use that system to assign calls to the driver who was in 
the most proximate location of a call. Ogden drivers took their "Ranger" tablets out of the 
trucks with them in order to receive any calls that came from Ogden. (R. 911, lines 1-21, 
R. 912, lines 6-25, R. 913, lines 1-24, R. 914, lines 4-25, R. 923, lines 3-25, R. 924, R. 925, 
lines 1-9.) Shannon, being an older man, was not comfortable using these tablets, so Ogden 
instead directly called his personal cell phone to assign calls to him. (R.885, lines 1-8.) 
While Ogden may argue that drivers could be "on" and "off-call", they testified that 
drivers are assigned calls, at any time, based upon the location of their trucks or if the call 
was initiated in the driver's respective region. "The nature of the business is not conducive 
to having a strict schedule for the drivers." (R. 911, lines 3-14, 912, line 25, R. 913, lines 
1-6, R. 916, lines 14-21.) Shannon understood this to be the case with him. (R. 893.) 
Indeed, the record before the District Court showed that for a six month period in 2012, 
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including the date of the Accident, Shannon completed 44 calls after 7 :00pm (the time of 
the Accident). He handled 38 of those calls in the weeks before the Accident. (R. 928-
949.) 
When he wished to take time off, he had to notify Ogden and ask that they not call 
him. (R. 913, lines 10-20, 916, lines 14-21.) 
As Shannon drove home on the night of the Accident, he understood that his drive 
was not merely for his personal benefit of getting home, but that he was subject to Ogden's 
control because he was subject to being called at any time. Though there were no calls that 
night, he testified that had he been called he would have responded. (R. 897. Lines 3-11, 
R. 899-900.) 
Accordingly, the District Court had undisputed evidence before that demonstrated 
that Ogden maintained sufficient control over Shannon at the time of the Accident to bring 
his actions within the course and scope of his employment. 
iii. Shannon's employer-provided Truck was an instrumentality of his 
employment and its involvement in the Accident suggests that Shannon 
was in the course and scope of his employment. 
As Ogden representatives testified, the employer-provided Truck is a crucial aspect 
of Shannon's job and was central to his job. 
An employer may be vicariously liable when employee using a company provided 
vehicle is involved in an accident with another while in the course and scope of his 
employment. Lane v. Messer, 731 P .2d 488 (Utah 1986). The issue is if an employee uses 
a vehicle as an instrumentality of his work or as only a means to commute to and from a 
"fixed office where the bulk of his work was performed." Cf Bailey v. Utah State Indus. 
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Comm., 398 P .2d 545, 54 7 ( 1965) (holding that within course and scope of employment 
because " ... it appears that the station wagon involved in the accident of this case was an 
instrumentality of decedent's business and was subject to that use") and Whitehead v. 
Variable Annuity Lffe Ins. Co., 801 P.2d 934, 937 (Utah 1989) (Employer was not in the 
course and scope because he worked a "nine to five schedule" at a "fixed office where the 
bulk of his work was performed" and was involved in an accident on his commute home). 
Lane v. Messer addressed a case where the employee was driving his company-
provided vehicle at the time of an accident. In that case, the Court did not deem the 
employee to have been acting within the course and scope of his employment when he 
returned home from work, left his home to go to a social club to consume alcohol, and on 
his way back home struck the plaintiff on the side of the highway. "Messer was not 
performing any act he was hired to perform and was not motivated in any way by a purpose 
to serve his employer at the time of the accident" at least in part because the accident 
occurred outside the time and space of his normal work. Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d 488, 
490 (Utah 1986). 
Shannon agrees with the Plaintiff-Appellant that, in the alternative, this Court 
should adopt the "instrumentality exception" in this action for negligence cases but only 
involving an employer-provided vehicle necessary for the employee's work. Appellant's 
Br. at 27-32. This is because this case involves a circumstance where the use of an 
employer-provided vehicle was of such vital importance in furthering the employer's 
business that the employer's control over Shannon could reasonably be inferred, 
particularly when the employer controls the instrumentality. See Lessard v. Coronado 
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Paint & Decorating Ctr., Inc., 2007-NMCA-122, 142 N.M. 583, 590, 168 P.3d 155 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 2007). 
Here, Shannon was operating his employer-provided Truck that was an 
instrumentality of his job at the time of the Accident for work purposes and not for personal 
reasons. Shannon was "always on call" and did not have a strict schedule. Accordingly, 
he understood that the nature of his work was that he could be called out at any time. He 
testified that at the time of the Accident he would have responded to a call if one had come. 
(R. (R. 897. Lines 3-11, R. 899-900.) He was motivated to serve his employer on that night 
and at all times. Unlike Lane, the Accident took place very close in space and time to when 
Shannon's last completed tow in Brigham City. Shannon was not on a personal errand 
hours after returning home. (R. 881-882, R. 889, lines 2-14, R. 898, lines 1-13.) Cf Lane, 
731 P .2d at 489-490 ( employee drove home and then headed out to social club almost four 
hours later). Ogden owned the Truck and provided it to Shannon for him to complete his 
work; taking it home was just "part of the job". (R. 890-891, R. 904, R. 913, lines 21-25, 
R. 914, lines 1-12, R. 919, lines 20-21, R. 925, lines 14-20.) As demonstrated above, 
Ogden exerted control over these "instrumentalities" because it always monitored the exact 
locations of its trucks and dispatched calls according to a truck's respective location. (R. 
911, lines 1-21, R. 912, lines 6-25, R. 913, lines 1-24, R. 914, lines 4-25, R. 923, lines 3-
25, R. 924, R. 925, lines 1-9.) 
Shannon agrees with the Plaintiff-Appellant that the Court should adopt the same 
instrumentality test that is used in workers compensation cases and apply it to negligence 
cases such that a factfinder could conclude that one is in the course and scope of his 
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employment when the employee is operating an employer-provided vehicle necessary for 
the employee's work. If this were a workers compensation case, that certainly would be 
the conclusion here. See Bailey, 398 P.2d at 547 (determining that the decedent was in the 
course and scope of employment because the car he was driving was for work purposes 
and was an instrumentality of his employment and not for personal use); Cf Ahlstrom, 
2003 UT 4, ,Il 7 ( officer voluntarily participated in an optional program that allowed her to 
take her police cruiser home and "was not required to use her employer's car for her 
commute home"). 
B. Ogden's other Actions Demonstrate that it Ratified His Conduct and thus 
Shannon was in the Course and Scope of Employment. 
Finally, there are other facts that demonstrate Ogden felt as if it was responsible for 
the Accident as Shannon's employer. 
It is a well-settled principle of agency law that "[a] principal may impliedly or 
expressly ratify an agreement made by an unauthorized agent." Dillon v. S. Mgmt. Corp., 
2014 UT 14, ,I28, 326 P.3d 656, 665. "[R]atification requires the principal to have 
knowledge of all material facts and an intent to ratify." Id "A deliberate and valid 
ratification with full knowledge of all the material facts is binding and cannot afterward be 
revoked or recalled". Id. "'Mere ratification' by an employer is precisely what justifies an 
employer's liability for the agent's actions." Diversified Holdings, L. C. v. Turner, 2002 
UT 129, ,I 36, 63 P.3d 686, 701 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §909(a) 
(1979)). 
19 
Here, Ogden ratified the actions of Shannon when it retained Randy Richards to 
assist Shannon with the citation for this Accident and when it paid his citation. As Shannon 
testified, Ogden "took care" of this citation for him. (R. 892, lines 12-21, R. 917, lines 7-
18.) Ogden knew of the Accident and the citations and still provided Shannon with counsel 
at its own expense and paid his citation. 
While Ogden has argued that the fact that Shannon had just picked up his dinner, 
Ogden allowed its drivers to eat in their trucks while they were working. That fact, alone, 
does not demonstrate that Shannon understood that he was "off duty." (R. 915, lines 6-
25.) 
In addition, Ogden allowed drivers to use their company trucks to run personal 
errands. Shannon admitted, however, that he does not do so without permission and that 
he preferred to drive his wife's Lexus. (R. 881-882, R. 889, lines 2-14, R. 898, lines 1-13, 
R. 915, lines 6-25.) 
Accordingly, there was evidence before the District Court that Ogden ratified 
Shannon's actions by providing him with counsel and paying his citation. They also took 
no steps, prior to the Accident, to prevent drivers from eating in their trucks or running 
personal errands on company time. These facts demonstrate that Ogden understood that 
Shannon was within the course and scope of his employment and reversal is appropriate. 
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II. BECAUSE THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT 
SHANNON WAS NOT ACTING WITHIN THE COURSE AND SCOPE 
OF HIS EMPLOYMENT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR OGDEN AUTO 
BODY SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
The District Court's only basis for granting Ogden Auto Body judgment as a matter 
of law with regards to Plaintiffs respondeat superior claim was that Shannon was not 
acting within the course and scope of his employment. As both the Appellant and Shannon 
have demonstrated that the ruling was erroneous, judgment must be reversed, in part. 
CONCLUSION 
Shannon respectfully asks the Court to REVERSE the District Court's Order 
Granting Defendant Ogden Auto Body's Motion for Summary Judgment as to the 
respondeat superior claim, and remand the case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 28th day of December 2015. 
STRONG & HANNI 
By: ISi Michael A. Stahler 
Robert L. Janicki 
Michael A. Stahler 
Attorneys for Michael James Shannon 
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